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Michael A. Boland, Bill B. Golden, and Leah J. Tsoodle
The objective is to identify significant determinants of performance for food processing
firms over the 1992 to 2003 time period, focusing particularly on the issue of family control.
Variables measuring firm effects such as asset size, governance, income distribution, and
risk are used to explain return on equity. This study builds upon previous research by
including a measure of income distribution in the food processing industry. Governance
variables are found to be significant determinants of return on equity. The results found no
evidence of agency problems in family-controlled firms during this time period.
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Food processing firms have a long history of
ownership structures that include family own-
ership (e.g., Campbell Soup, Cargill, Pilgrim’s
Pride, Tyson Foods). Many of these family-
owned companies developed governance
structures that enabled them to control the
company through their bylaws (e.g., one share
of family-owned stock in Smucker’s Foods
had different voting rights than one share of
nonfamily owned stock; the Coors family
owns the preferred stock which is the only
voting stock in the firm) or by the founding
family’s ownership of a majority of stock (e.g.,
Wrigley).
A recent study by Anderson and Reeb
(2003) found that founding-family ownership
resulted in higher performance over the 1992
to 1999 time period for firms in the Standard
& Poor’s top 500 (S&P500). This study was
widely cited in the popular press, such as
Business Week, as evidence that family own-
ership is an effective organizational structure.
However, the study’s results contradicted most
management theory on this topic, which has
long suggested that there are inherent agency
problems when insiders such as management
control a firm. Over one-third of the firms in
the S&P500 are family-controlled in their
study.
1
New regulations have been passed that
make it more difficult for families to control a
business. The U.S. Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. This act estab-
lished new rules for companies that are
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1Family-controlled is used to denote firms that are
controlled by family members through the governance
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Concerns over insider trading and perceived
lack of independence of directors were reasons
cited for passage of this legislation. This Act
has implications for the governance of family-
controlled firms. For example, this Act
requires firms to change their governance to
enable all stock to have the same vote.
Families can still control a business through
majority ownership of equity (e.g., Pilgrim’s
Pride and Tyson Foods). However, it cannot
change its governance to enable the family to
exert control without having the equity, such
as the case of Smucker’s.
The objective of this research is to identify
significant determinants of performance for
food processing firms over the 1992 to 2003
time period, focusing particularly on the role
of family control. Variables measuring firm
effects such as asset size, governance, income
distribution, and risk are used to explain
return on equity. This study builds upon
previous research by including a measure of
income distribution in the food processing
industry.
Background Literature on Agency Theory
Jensen and Meckling described the classic
principal-agent relationship. The agency prob-
lem is one aspect of this relationship. Agency
problems arise when 1) the objectives of the
principal and agent are different and 2)
asymmetric information exists that makes it
difficult for the principal to monitor the
agent’s actions. These problems exist for the
relationship between outside shareholders and
managers. Agency theory suggests that when
an owner-manager allows outside equity to
enter the firm and its governance structure
(e.g., ownership and control are separated),
the value of the firm will decline (Demsetz,
Fama, and Jensen).
Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino argue that
family-controlled organizations present differ-
ent agency problems. Altruism and kinship
enable families to reduce agency problems but
in general, the literature suggests that agency
costs are higher in family-controlled firms.
The behavioral economics literature has sug-
gested that monitoring costs are higher in
family-controlled firms because private own-
ership is not subject to market discipline. Exit
costs are also higher for family-controlled
firms because family members cannot liqui-
date all of their stock shares at the same time
because the price would decline. Family
members who exit are also thought to lose
emotional status and special privileges that
come from being an owner. Family-controlled
firms have higher agency costs due to greater
conflict resolution costs. The following litera-
ture review highlights some of the more
important papers on the importance of
ownership structure in agency theory.
Ownership Structure as an Agency Problem
Monsen, Chiu, and Cooley analyzed the
separation of ownership and control in large
firms and investigated the possible effect of
such separation upon the performance of such
firms. They found that owner-controlled firms
performed better financially than other firms.
Their results showed that the control type
(owner versus manager) was significant for all
industries.
Ware compared the performance of man-
ager (e.g., nonfamily owned) and owner-
controlled (e.g., family owned) firms in the
food and beverage industry. These data
allowed Ware to maintain some homogeneity
(e.g., food and beverage industry), which
ensured a more sensitive test of the ownership
hypothesis. Ware used four performance
measures including profitability, efficiency,
earnings retention, and external debt manage-
ment. He found that owner-controlled firms
did not earn a higher rate of return than
manager-controlled firms and found that
owner-controlled firms had a higher average
product of labor, implying that owner-con-
trolled firms tended to be less efficient.
Fama and Jensen suggested that ownership
control (e.g., as in the family-owned firm)
could allow their shareholders to receive
economic rents in lieu of corporate profits.
Demsetz’s classic paper in this literature
showed that owners who controlled the
624 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008company could choose to pursue nonprofit
maximizing objectives and not invest in
profitable assets. Demsetz and Lehn examined
the causes and consequences of the structure
of corporate ownership. They identified firm
size, instability of profit rate, and industry
effects (e.g., regulated utility, financial institu-
tion, mass media, or sports industry) as
variables that significantly impacted owner-
ship structure. However, they did not find a
significant relationship between ownership
concentration and profit rates.
Stein showed that shareholders (e.g., such
as family members) who have longer invest-
ment horizons have a better business strategy
because they are more likely to undertake
decisions that benefit the firm in the long run
rather than short run. Casson and James
suggest that family-controlled firms invest
more conservatively because they seek to pass
their wealth onto succeeding generations
rather than consume all of their wealth in
their generation. Furthermore, family control
may result in the family using more debt
financing because the family develops a
network of relationships with lenders and
other service providers over time. Anderson,
Mansi, and Reeb attribute debt financing to
the firm’s desire to maintain a positive
reputation and share information regarding
its business strategy.
Anderson and Reeb (2003) analyzed the
relationship between founding-family owner-
ship and firm performance in the S&P500.
They found that family ownership is both
prevalent and substantial and that family
firms outperform nonfamily firms. They also
found that the relationship between family
holdings and firm performance is nonlinear
and that when family members serve as CEO,
performance is better than with outside CEOs.
Their results were inconsistent with the idea
that minority shareholders are adversely
affected by family ownership, suggesting that
family ownership is an effective organizational
structure. Overall, their results implied that, in
well-regulated, transparent markets, family
ownership of public firms reduced agency
problems without leading to severe losses in
decision-making efficiency.
Role of Monitoring as an Agency Problem
Shleifer and Vishney developed a theoretical
model to determine the impact of monitoring
the performance of management by a large
minority shareholder. Their research suggest-
ed that there was an incentive to increase
ownership concentration and corporate versus
personal investment choices. Burkart, Panuzi,
and Shleifer examined the costs and benefits of
large shareholders and their monitoring of
firm management. They found that tight
control by shareholders increased firm effi-
ciency, but created an expropriation threat
that reduced managerial initiative and non-
contractible investments. They also showed
that ownership concentration, which implies
monitoring, might conflict with performance-
based incentive schemes.
Pagano and Roell analyzed the influence
of agency costs and monitoring on the choice
of stock ownership structure. They argued
that the optimal ownership structure for a
firm’s controlling shareholder includes some
measure of dispersion to avoid excessive
monitoring. This dispersion can be achieved
by taking the firm public, but this decision
involves costs. Thus, the owner faced a
tradeoff between the cost of providing a
liquid market and over-monitoring. They
found that the listing decision was affected
by the amount of external funding required,
the strictness of disclosure rules for public
versus private firms, and the legal limits on
bribes aimed at limiting shareholder moni-
toring.
Ang, Cole, and Lin examined small firms
to provide measures of absolute and relative
equity agency costs for firms under a wide
variety of ownership and management struc-
tures. Jensen and Meckling’s zero agency-cost
firm was utilized for the base case in relative
comparisons. Ang, Cole, and Lin calculated
agency costs related to the separation of
ownership and control by comparing the
efficiency of firms managed by shareholders
to the efficiency of firms managed by outsid-
ers. Multivariate regressions were estimated
using ownership structure, external monitor-
ing, capital structure, industry effects, annual
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They found that agency costs, as measured by
the ratio of operating expenses to annual sales,
are significantly higher when an outsider
rather than an insider manages the company.
In their sample, agency costs were inversely
related to the manager’s ownership share and
were positively related to the number of
nonmanager shareholders. Agency costs were
found to be lower with increased bank
monitoring.
Income Distribution as an Agency Problem
Johnson et al. focused on ‘‘tunneling,’’ which
is defined as the transfer of assets and profits
out of firms for the benefit of those who
control the firms. Using legal case history,
they found that tunneling can be substantial
even in developed countries. In addition, they
found that much of the tunneling is consistent
with both statutes and basic principles fol-
lowed by judges and that this legal tunneling
was done in a variety of ways.
Faccio, Lang, and Young examined the
incidence of insider shareholder expropriation
of outside shareholders by comparing divi-
dend payments across corporations in two
regions where firms are predominantly fam-
ily-owned—East Asia and Western Europe.
They found significant differences between
dividend payments among East Asian and
Western European companies. Western Eu-
ropean corporations had significantly higher
mean dividends. Their results implied that
corporate managers for tightly controlled
firms had to pay higher dividends to offset
investor concerns about expropriation. The
authors concluded that there was a significant
difference in the dividend behaviors of
corporations that are group affiliated. Inves-
tors appear to perceive a greater threat to
expropriation within tightly controlled cor-
porations relative to corporations falling into
the loosely affiliated groups. Therefore,
through higher dividend payments, capital
markets are largely successful in policing
expropriation within tightly controlled groups
but are not as successful within loosely
affiliated groups.
Summary of the Literature
In general, the literature has found that firm
structure, monitoring, and income distribution
lead to agency problems and insider control of
a firm has resulted in less than optimal
performance. The original theoretical papers
did not distinguish between control by family
members who may be management and
control by management who are not family
members. The theory is beginning to note that
family-controlled businesses may not exhibit
agency theory issues because the empirical
literature (i.e., Anderson and Reeb 2003) is
finding evidence of better performance rather
than poorer performance. However, agency
theory issues may be more likely to arise with
control being exhibited by managers (e.g.,
short-term time horizon) who do not have the
long-term time horizon that a family might
have with regard to control.
Until recently, much of the information
regarding governance was not publicly avail-
able or costly to obtain. Thus, with the
exception of Anderson and Reeb (2003) and
Ang, Cole, and Lin, the literature has been
primarily theoretical in nature. Consequently,
explicit hypothesis tests of specific agency
variables and their relationship with perfor-
mance are derived from these two papers.
The concept of agency theory has been
described in the agricultural economics litera-
ture (e.g., most recently by Cook and Barry)
but empirical tests of the theory have not been
done on agribusinesses or food businesses.
This study contributes to that literature with
an empirical study of agency theory as applied
to a homogeneous industry (e.g., food pro-
cessing) and focuses on the impact of organi-
zational forms (e.g., family controlled and
nonfamily controlled).
Agency Theory and the Food
Processing Industry
The previous section describes the literature
on agency theory and discusses why it is
important. This section discusses reasons why
the food processing industry is a unique sector
for analysis.
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and Producers
Agency theory has been used to explain the
relationship between tenants and land owners
(Allen and Leuck), poultry producers and
slaughter and processing plants (Knoeber;
Martinez; Menard), and orchard fruits and
pollinating services run by beekeepers
(Cheung). James, Klein, and Sykuta argue
that the nature of the relationships between
pork, poultry, and soybean farmers and the
respective processors of these products (e.g.,
pork and poultry processors and oilseed
crushers) helps explain the dramatic growth
in organizational form in these industries.
Dorsey and Boland show that most vertical
integration has occurred at stages beyond the
producer and that some industries such as
processing have premiums from integration
and others such as restaurants have discounts.
Policy Makers and Industrial Organization of
Food Processing Sector
Understanding the nature of industrial orga-
nization in the food economy industry has
been identified as a top priority by policy
makers in the U.S. Congress as evidenced by
the fact that more than $17 million has been
appropriated since 2000 to study the food
economy beyond the farm gate (e.g., not
production agriculture). These funds have
been used in at least 14 departments of
agricultural economics in land grant universi-
ties and have been included in annual appro-
priations funding. This is more money than
has been appropriated for economics of
production agriculture research not including
Hatch Act funds. The food processing indus-
try is far bigger than the food wholesaling
and food retailing industry with regard to
asset size and consumer brands (Schumacher
and Boland).
Food Processing Sector has Unique
Organizational Structures
Cooperatives are a unique organizational
form in agriculture. Producers who are
vertically integrated through processing coop-
eratives control the governance of the coop-
erative by special legislation passed by Con-
gress in the Capper-Volstead Act and featured
in many state incorporation statutes that are
unique to agriculture (Baarda). In addition,
cooperatives have access to cooperative exten-
sion service resources as noted by Boyd et al.
Boland provides numerous examples of coop-
eratives that have changed their organization-
al form in recent years but maintained control
by producers. He also suggests that many
cooperatives are analyzing how family-owned
companies transitioned from equity provided
by family members to issuing public securities
and yet devising a governance mechanism to
ensure family control. Chaddad and Cook
provide a typography for better understanding
these organizational forms but it should be
noted that most cooperatives that have
restructured do so for a combination of
reasons.
Agency Theory in the Food Processing Sector
These facts suggest that family-controlled
food processors may have some characteristics
that suggest they are more profitable than
nonfamily controlled firms. Agency theory
suggests that the control function through
governance is crucial in explaining perfor-
mance. There has been no study that has
sought to analyze whether these unique
features of the food processing sector (e.g.,
family control) have led to better perfor-
mance. The literature review on agency theory
would suggest that performance would be less
but the fact that family control has remained
such a key organizational form in the food
processing industry would suggest that this
is not the case. This research addresses this
issue.
Finally, previous research has not studied
the effect of cash dividends (as opposed to
stock splits) on performance. This is an
important variable because most firms choose
to use retained income to finance the organi-
zation rather than pay cash dividends
(Mayer). However, agency theory would
suggest that family firms would pay cash
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founding family have their wealth tied up in
the company’s equity. Thus, the family would
prefer cash payments over time. None of the
previous literature has measured income
distribution as an agency variable. Thus, this
research uses variables used in the empirical
literature (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Ang,
Cole, and Lin;) and adds an additional
variable for cash dividends.
Description of the Data
Data for this study are obtained from the
Standard and Poor’s Compustat Business
Segment Reports for firms in the food
processing sector for the period of 1992 to
2003.
2 A total of 40 firms were identified
including 15 nonfamily-controlled firms and
25 family-controlled firms. There are 12 years
of data for these 40 firms, or 480 total
observations.
The identification of family-controlled
firms is critical for this analysis. Corporate
histories are used from Hoovers, The Corpo-
rate Library, and individual company records
including SEC documents to determine wheth-
er a business is family controlled and to
construct the variables used in this study.
The variable for family control is the same
as that used in the literature. Namely, a
family-controlled business is one where the
founder or descendants continue to hold
positions as CEO, chairman of the board of
directors, or are the largest equity holders in
the company. Financial performance is mea-
sured by the return on equity (ROE), which is
calculated as earnings before interest and taxes
divided by equity.
3 ROE is the most common
theoretical measure of performance in the
literature.
Variable Descriptions
The theoretical model used in this research to
identify significant determinants of perfor-
mance for food processing firms is the
following:
ROE ~ f Firm effects, industry effects, time ðÞ :
Firm effects are measured using variables from
two principal empirical pieces of research
(Anderson and Reeb 2003; Ang, Lin, and
Cole). ASSETS measures the relative asset size
of a firm and a positive relationship between
ROE and assets has been found in the
literature. FIRMRISK is measured as the
standard deviation of ROE. Ruefli, Collins,
and Lacugna showed this variable to be the
mostcommonmeasurementoffirmriskinover
100 studies.
Governance variables are also considered
firm effects. The theoretical literature suggests
that the greater control exhibited by family
members or other insiders would lead to lower
performance. INSIDER is measured as the
percentage of equity held by all officers
(typically members of management and family
members). These officers monitor the perfor-
mance of the firm on behalf of their own
equity as well as the equity of other stock-
holders. Anderson and Reeb (2003) found a
positive relationship between the amount of
equity owned by insiders and performance,
which was contrary to much of the theoretical
literature.
OUTSIDE is measured as the ratio of
directors considered independent divided by
the total number of directors. This variable
measures the influence of outside directors on
the firm. These directors are also hypothesized
to monitor the performance of the firm on
behalf of the stockholders. Anderson and
2At the beginning of this time period, the data
included 54 firms; at the end of this time period the
data included only 45 firms. Although not discussed in
this study, models were estimated with the 1992 to
1999 data, which would have included these additional
nine firms. However, this did not change the results so
the 45 firms through the 2003 time period were used.
3Other dependent variables that we considered
were return on assets and q (inverse of Tobin’s q).
Return on assets was not chosen because the
theoretical foundation of agency theory is built
around the wealth of the company, which is equity,
and other studies have made similar arguments. Q is
measured in the Compustat data, but it has many
missing values. There is one study in the finance and
strategy literature that has used this variable, but
McGahan was forced to discard almost one-third of
the observations because of missing values.
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a board of directors, the better performance
that can be expected, which agrees with the
theoretical literature.
BLOCKHOLDERS measures the percent-
age of directors with blocks of equity greater
than 5% who are not family members (i.e.,
pension funds, etc.) and is another measure of
independence. This hypothesis is the same as
OUTSIDE. Namely, an increase in the per-
centage of equity held by blockholders who
are not affiliated with the family leads to
improved performance. However, Anderson
and Reeb (2003) found a significant and
negative relationship between this variable
and profitability. FAMILY is a binary vari-
able that measures whether a firm is family-
controlled. The theoretical literature suggests
that a family-controlled firm has lower per-
formance whereas Anderson and Reeb (2003)
found improved performance.
An additional governance variable measur-
ing income distribution is constructed for this
research. This variable, INCOMED, which
has not been used in any previous studies in
the literature, measures whether a firm paid a
cash dividend. Many firms have typically
retained all of the net income and issued stock
or stock splits in lieu of cash dividends or
repurchased shares (Fama and French). The
rationale is that this income is taxed twice;
once at the corporate level and once at the
shareholder level. The literature has shown
that family members may prefer seeing cash
dividends for consumption purposes. Finally,
Mayer has noted that internal retention of
income is the most common method of
financing growth in many firms.
Industry and Time Fixed Effect
Industry effects are measured by the use of a
three-digit SIC code that is a binary variable
(SIC) corresponding to whether a firm is
categorized in that classification code. Indus-
try effects (e.g., ‘‘Fama–French industry var-
iables’’) have been shown to be important
components of profitability in the food
economy (Schumacher and Boland). A binary
variable for year (YEAR) is included for each
year in the data. Table 1 provides the means
and standard deviations for the data. Table 2
provides information about the means based
on ownership structure.
Estimation Issue and Model Diagnostics
The literature review has identified different
variables from theory for measuring firm
performance. The empirical model estimated
Table 1. Definitions, Mean, and SD for

















a ROE is earnings before interest and taxes as a percentage of
total equity.
b FAMILY is a binary variable where 1 is family-controlled
and 0 is otherwise.
c INSIDER is the equity held by inside directors as a
percentage of total equity.
d OUTSIDE is the number of directors outside the company
as a percentage of total directors.
e BLOCKHOLDERS is the number of unaffiliated directors
with more than 5% block ownership as a percentage of total
directors.
f FIRMRISK is a five-year moving average of the standard
deviation of ROE.
g INCOMED is a binary variable where 1 indicates the firm
paid a cash dividend and 0 is otherwise.





ROE, % 19.03 19.21
ASSETS, hundred million $ 59.45 38.70
INSIDER, % 1.70 32.88
OUTSIDE, % 76.57 54.22
BLOCKHOLDERS, % 7.95 28.97
FIRMRISK 26.28 11.42
INCOMED 0.00 0.52
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ROE ~ b0 z b1   ASSETS z b2   FAMILY
z b3   INSIDER z b4   OUTSIDE
z b5   BLOCKHOLDERS z
b6   FIRMRISKz b7   INCOMED
X 23
i~8
bi   SIC z
X 34
j~24
bj   YEAR:
The betas are parameters to be estimated and
the variables were defined previously. Panel
data regression techniques are employed and





The panel data has a time-series component,
which suggests the possibility of correlated
errors. In the presence of autocorrelation the
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator will be
unbiased but will be inefficient. The Durbin-
Watson bounds test is often used to detect the
presence of an autoregressive error structure.
Based on Greene, the Durbin-Watson statistic
for a model with multiple cross-sections can be
estimated as the simple average of the Durbin-
Watson statistic for the individual cross-
sections. For the purpose of this analysis,
individual cross-sections are based on the
Department of Commerce Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code. The calculated
Durbin-Watson statistic for the model is
1.081. The upper and lower critical bounds
are 0.171 and 3.149 respectively. The calculat-
ed statistics fall in the inconclusive region.
Since the OLS estimator is unbiased and
correcting for autocorrelation by imposing
inappropriate temporal dependencies may
generate greater inefficiencies, no correction
for autocorrelation was made to the model.
The temporal component suggests that
model efficiency might be enhanced by the
inclusion of yearly binary variables in the
model specification. The model was estimated
with yearly binary variables. An F test failed
to reject the null hypothesis, that as a group
the parameter estimates on the yearly binary
variables were equal to zero (p-value 5 0.4179
and F-value 5 1.03). The implication is that
the yearly effects may not be significant.
However, several of the individual parameter
estimates were statistically significant. Follow-
ing the example of Anderson and Reeb (2004),
yearly binary variables were included in the
model estimation as fixed effects.
The data also consists of cross-sectional
(three-digit SIC codes) components. The
presence of groupwise heteroscedasticity poses
problems for inference based on OLS estima-
tion. Green proposes a Lagrange multiplier
(LM) test as a means of testing for the
presence of groupwise heteroscedastic errors.
Based on the OLS model estimation, the LM
statistic was calculated as 493.15 with a chi
squared critical value of 27.587. Based on
these statistics the null hypothesis of homo-
skedastic errors is rejected and the model
needs correction for the heteroscedasticity.
The feasible generalized least squares (FGLS)
estimation technique proposed by Green was
used to correct the heteroscedasticity problem.
Endogeneity Diagnostics
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia and Ander-
son and Reeb (2003) suggest that firm
performance and family ownership might be
simultaneously determined, which would re-
sult in estimation bias due to endogeneity.
Specifically, endogeneity may exist because
families that own profitable firms may main-
tain control, while those owning less profitable
firms may sell their controlling interest.
However, this argument is problematic in that
it implies that family firms would have to be
exceptionally farsighted in predicting perfor-
mance and require special insights into future
firm performance not available to nonfamily-
4Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that firm
performance is determined nonlinearly by the per-
centage ownership of the officers and directors.
Natural log and quadratic variations of this variable
were tested against the linear version. There is no
evidence to suggest that nonlinear ownership structure
impacts firm performance when all ownership struc-
tures are considered in these data. These results are
available from the authors upon request.
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endogeneity.
While estimating the ownership variable
with appropriate instrumental variables and
using the estimate as a proxy for the
ownership variable is intuitively pleasing, it is
not without pitfalls. Natural instruments,
those characteristics that may predict owner-
ship, are typically already included as deter-
minants in the firm performance equation.
That is, it is possible to argue that any variable
that is a reasonable determinant of family
ownership (FAMILY) is also a determinant of
firm performance. Nevertheless, similar to
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia and Ander-
son and Reeb (2003), a two stage least squares
(2SLS) estimation technique is used for the
endogeneity problem. The same instruments
used by these authors are used here. Namely,
FAMILY is estimated as a function of
ASSETS, the square of ASSETS, FIRMRISK
and control for the SIC fixed effects. These
variables are highly significant in explaining
ownership structure.
The Spencer and Berk test is used to
determine if endogeneity exists between family
and firm performance (Greene). A Wald
statistic was constructed as a function of the
differences in the feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS), parameter estimates devel-
oped in the preceding section and two-stage
least squares (2SLS) parameter estimates and
their associated estimated variances. The
FGLS estimates treat FAMILY as exogenous,
while the 2SLS estimates treat the variable as
endogenous. The Wald statistic is 0.1023. The
critical value is 3.841. This suggests that the
null hypothesis of the exogenous nature of
FAMILY is not rejected. This test should not
be construed as a statement that ownership
structure and firm performance may not be
simultaneously determined, but rather a state-
ment that after industry effects are accounted
for endogeneity may not be a major problem.
This finding is consistent with those of
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia. Table 3
reports regression results for both the FGLS
and 2SLS estimation. Parameter estimates for
the FGLS and 2SLS are comparable indicat-
ing that parameter estimates are robust and
relatively invariant to estimation technique.
5
Results
Results for both the FGLS and 2SLS are
shown in Table 3. However, only the results of
the 2SLS are discussed. The coefficient of
determination was 0.686. ASSETS, INSID-
ER, FIRMRISK, and INCOMED were
statistically significant variables in explaining
ROE. An increase in size as measured by
ASSETS led to an increase in ROE. A similar
finding in the literature suggests that larger
firms, as measured by asset size, may be able
5The regression results for the instrumental
variables regression are available from the authors
upon request.












OUTSIDE 0.069 (0.074) 0.107 (0.068)







R Square 0.684 0.686
RMSE 0.086 0.085
a Fixed effects are not reported but were used in the regression model.
b Denotes significance at the 0.10 level. SEs are in parentheses.
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is measured in hundred-million-dollar units,
and the parameter estimate of 0.05 implies
that an increase of one hundred million dollars
results in an increase in ROE of 0.05%,o ra n
increase of $1.71 million in annual earnings
before interest and taxes.
As the amount of equity held by inside
directors (INSIDER) increased, this led to an
increase in ROE. A parameter estimate of
0.113 implies that a 1% increase in INSIDER
increases ROE by 0.113%, or an increase of
$3.866 million in annual earnings before
interest and taxes. The result of this hypothesis
test does not provide evidence for problems
related to agency theory because an increase in
the equity held by management insiders or
family members would result in more board
leadership positions within the company. For
example, the chair of the board of directors is
often the largest shareholder in the company.
The chair has many important responsibilities
including setting the agenda (often in cooper-
ation with the CEO) for the board meeting
and often having the most frequent contact
with the CEO and upper management. A good
principle of boards is that the board and CEO
have the same vision and strategy for a
company. More frequent contact and interac-
tion between the chair and CEO, who are
often related in many family-controlled firms,
leads to more communication and agreement
about the overall direction of a firm.
An increase in the variability of ROE
(FIRMRISK) led to an increase in ROE. A
1% increase in FIRMRISK led to a 0.781%
increase in ROE, or an increase of $26.71 mil-
lion in annual earnings before interest and
taxes. This suggests that an increase in risk led
to an increase in performance. Empirical work
often finds a positive or negative sign on this
variable depending upon the industry being
measured. However, economic theory would
suggest that this variable has a positive sign
such as found here.
One of the main variables of interest is
FAMILY. Family-controlled firms (FAMI-
LY) had greater ROE than nonfamily con-
trolled firms, but the parameter estimate was
not statistically significant. This would suggest
that this variable by itself is not a significant
measure of agency theory.
6
The amount of income distributed in the
form of cash dividends was significant and
positive with a 1% increase in INCOMED
leading to a 10.481% increase in ROE. This
relatively large magnitude suggests that this
variable is important in explaining perfor-
mance.
Implications
There are several implications of this research
for food processing firms. A greater percent-
age of equity held by insiders such as
management and family members leads to
greater performance. Management exerts an
important monitoring function on an organi-
zation, and the fact that an insider such as
management is allowed to own stock and be
represented on the board of directors leads to
better performance is an important finding for
food processing firms.
However, other governance variables were
not found to be significant determinants of
profitability in this research. These results do
not support the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
requiring independent directors on the board,
implying that directors that are not under the
control of insiders, such as management or
family members, lead to decision making that
is best for the firm’s performance and avoids
agency problems. This result does not agree
with the agency literature on ownership and
monitoring and suggests that this problem
may not have been an issue for these family-
controlled firms during the time period being
studied.
6The correlation coefficients between INSIDER
and FAMILY, and INCOMED and FAMILY are
0.53 and 0.57, respectively. These are not high enough
to warrant concerns about multicollinearity. However,
when INSIDER or INCOMED is deleted from the
model, FAMILY becomes significant at the 0.10 level
of significance and positive. Thus, interpretation of
the FAMILY variable is ambiguous by itself. Because
no food processing firms that were not family-
controlled paid cash dividends during this time period,
it was not possible to construct an interaction term
between this variable (INCOMED) and INSIDER or
FAMILY.
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trolled firms have greater performance than
nonfamily owned firms in the food processing
sector during the time period being analyzed.
This result suggests that the perceived agency
problems associated with family ownership
may not have led to inferior performance in
food processing firms during the time period
studied. This implication reinforces the fact
that no variables measuring agency problems
were found to be significant.
Income distribution was found to be
significantly correlated with better perfor-
mance. That is, cash dividends helped explain
better performance. This result is new since
this variable has not been used in any previous
empirical studies. The U.S. Congress passed a
law that reduced the tax on corporate
dividends to the same rate as capital gains
(i.e., 15%) in 2003. A survey of 384 chief
financial officers found that an increase in
earnings and better corporate governance
demanded by institutional investors were cited
as reasons for this increase (Brav et al.).
Future research could analyze the impact of
income distribution after implementation of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Agency theory is commonly used to
explain the relationship between principals
and their agents. Agency problems may exist
in any organization. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 was enacted into law because of the
corporate scandals involving Enron, World-
com, and other businesses. A board of
directors controls a company and hires an
agent in a CEO. Family members who have
different goals can result in a family-controlled
firm performing less efficiently than firms
where agency problems are not prevalent.
However, agency problems were not found in
the data of food processing firms for this time
period.
The food processing sector is an important
sector for analysis because of its interest by
policy makers and researchers. There are more
family-owned firms in this sector than all but
one sector of the U.S. economy. This study
suggests that agency problems may not have
existed among these family-controlled food
processing firms during the time period being
studied. Indeed, performance was found to be
better for firms with greater levels of equity
held by insiders and those who paid cash
dividends, which is consistent with other
empirical studies on other industries.
[Received June 2007; Accepted December 2007.]
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